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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for USSR

SUBJECT: Text for Harvard presentation

Bob Gates approved my making a seminar presentation to the faculty of the Harvard University Center for International Affairs. The session will be informal and off-the-record, but I've prepared a text (attached). The seminar will occur on 11 December.


Fritz W. Ermarth

Attachment: As stated

cc: D/SOVA
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L-305

"THE PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF THE GORBACHEV REGIME"

SEMINAR PRESENTATION TO HARVARD UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Fritz W. Ermarth
11 DECEMBER 1985

I. Introduction

The Soviet Union has always been an interesting country. Now it is more interesting than ever, because much is in flux and there is a tinge of uncertainty about almost everything. As Tocqueville once said about a situation sufficiently analogous to make it worth recalling: "No moment is more dangerous -- let us here simply say uncertain -- than when an incompetent dictatorship seeks to mend its ways." I want in these remarks to survey what is being done by and what lies before the Soviet dictatorship, which is remarkably competent at some things but even more remarkably incompetent at things it regards as very vital, as it seeks to mend its ways.

Although my opinions are informed by all the information at my disposal and the experienced judgments of my colleagues, I want you to understand that these opinions are my own, not those of the US government or any of its components. Further, in order that these institutions be spared the necessity of having to explain or justify or repudiate what I have to say, my comments are off the record. I hope, nevertheless, that they are worth remembering.

II. The Essential Problems

There is no doubt that the new Gorbachev regime is trying, as the cliché has it, to get the Soviet Union moving again. What that regime is now attempting to do is fairly clear. What it may decide to do in the near future as it pursues its professed goals is rather less clear. Far less clear is how well it will fare, and how it will respond to the unpredictable problems of failure or, perhaps even, of success in its policies. In my opinion, least clear but most important of all is the response of Soviet society to the proddings of a regime whose tools have become weak and, even more so, seemingly irrelevant to its avowed objectives. If there is any message I wish to leave it is that there is in the USSR a society to be concerned about, an obshchestvo as distinct from gosudarstvo, a society worthy of official as well as scholarly attention.

The essential problems of the Gorbachev regime are three:

First, the legacies of a moribund top political leadership, the most important of which is a lethargic and parasitic ruling apparatus which is a far cry from the mobilizational tool it is supposed to be, but rather an obstacle to progress on all fronts. And therefore, dialectically, a potential threat to its own legitimacy and survival in the long term.

Second, a stagnant or very sluggish economy operating in the context of a disgruntled society.

Third, a foreign policy which has in the recent past proved unable to exploit its opportunities fully, to adapt to new challenges, and to apply satisfactorily the power available to back it up.

This stress on the problems of the Soviet system should not obscure its great sources of strength: A vast, if backward, economic base; remarkable political stability; opportunities to extend its influence in world affairs; and great military power. We are reminded of another hoary aphorism: "Russia is never as strong or as weak as she looks." Perhaps the reverse is true now: Russia is stronger and weaker than she looks.

III. The Roots of Gorbachev

The political personalities of Gorbachev himself and of his leadership cadre are certainly important factors in the shaping the Soviet future. Much has been made of the proposition that Gorbachev and his emerging cadre of appointees represent a new leadership generation in the USSR. What kind of a generation it is, how and how much it differs from its predecessors remains to be seen. As this leadership cohort takes its positions, we shall find that they are certainly products of the system in its mature and stable years. They reached adulthood generally in the late Stalin period. Their careers were generally launched in the organizational and ideological turmoil of the Khrushchev years, from which they appear to have profitted. Then they

were held back by the stasis of the Brezhnev period, from which they acquired the impatience that characterizes Gorbachev and policies.

In Gorbachev we see a curious mixture of orthodoxy and pragmatism, of the doctrinaire and the flexible. His admirers proclaim that he is a new leader of the Leninist type. Some of his detractors as well as admirers see a Stalinist profile under the new style of frankness and openness he is clearly trying to cultivate. Gorbachev's specific political antecedents are still somewhat obscure. There are some suggestions that his roots go back to the corps of Komsomol types which Shelepin was trying to build as his political base in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

To the extent Gorbachev views himself as a reformer, it is certainly within the framework of the system's established structure and political features. He is in no way an Alexander Dubcek or even a Deng Tsiao-ping. It is probably a mistake, in any case, to attribute to Gorbachev and his colleagues an integrated vision, much less a complete political program, for achieving their aims. Gorbachev appears to believe that the pretenses of the system with regard to growth, modernization, welfare, and power in the world can be realized. And he seems further to believe that the top-down formula for managing society, on which the system is based, will provide the realization...with some allowance for stimulating the creativity of the masses.

But, to repeat my earlier point, what Gorbachev and his regime want to do may be a less interesting question than what the society, the obshchestvo, stimulates or obliges the regime to do in the years ahead.

IV. Leadership

Let me turn now to Gorbachev's political agenda, the first item of which -- in some ways the easiest -- has been getting a hold on the power structure.

Looking back on it it with not-very-much hindsight, Gorbachev's accession to the General Secretaryship appears to have been a shoe-in, or almost so. He had a lot going for him: Andropov's patronage, formidable maneuvering skills of his own, and the elite's almost universal conviction that -- painful though it might be -- the rule of old duffers had to end. But it was not automatic. Chernenko's elevation after Andropov's death indicated that the transition did not come easy. In the fall of 1984, Chernenko showed his ability to block Gorbachev. When Chernenko died, there were ten full members of the Politburo. Only one of them, Vorotnikov, looked like a clear Gorbachev partisan. Grishin, Romanov, Tikhonov, Kunayev, and Shcherbitskiy looked like clear opponents, but Shcherbitskiy was conveniently tied up getting back from a trip to the US. Aliyev had the reputation of an opportunist, but seems to have gone for Gorbachev. Solomentsev, for some reason or other, did so as well.

Gromyko may have been the swing and crucial vote; this old duffer went for the young blood, it seems. Perhaps there was a deal involving his prospective elevation to the honorific presidency. Perhaps it was a family connection via Raisa. Perhaps because old Gromyko is something other than the man he seems to be. Other voices, such as that of the KGB and, perhaps, the military were probably heard from. In any case, Gromyko nominated Gorbachev to the Central Committee in a remarkably eloquent statement -- so eloquent in fact as to sound slightly ironical. Bottom line: It may have been easy, but it was not automatic. There were left changes to make and scores to settle.

Gorbachev's first priority has been to build his power base in the Politburo and the central party apparatus. This he has done with remarkable dispatch. He has brought in two new full members of the Politburo without putting them through candidate status: Nikolai Ryzhkov, the new Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and apparently a Gorbachev associate; and *Yegor* Ligachev, the chief Central Committee Secretary for ideology and cadres, effectively the Second Secretary. Gorbachev and Ligachev appear to have worked closely together during the Andropov and Chernenko periods to push cadre renewal and the campaign against corruption. As the heir to Suslov's mantle and ascetic image, Ligachev will be a man to watch.

Two new Politburo members have been elevated from candidate status: Chebrikov, the KGB chief, and Shevardnadze, the new Foreign Minister. There are two new candidates, Marshal Sokolov, whose status represents a downgrading of the military which may not last, and Talyzin, the new first deputy premier and planning chief. And there are three new Central Committee secretaries: Nikonov, Yel'tsin, and Zaykov.

Gorbachev's treatment of the Old Guard has testified to his power and his skill in avoiding protracted confrontation. He unceremoniously removed and banished Romanov, ostensibly his most powerful rival, a man made vulnerable by a history of high-handed management, corruption, and alcohol abuse. Somewhat more decorously he retired Tikhonov, the aging Premier, but this interestingly only after Tikhonov had been identified at the April Plenum as the man who would present the next five year plan to the coming party congress. And he kicked Gromyko upstairs to the largely honorific post of President the latter appears to enjoy. Thereby Gorbachev got full control over foreign policy and solved the Gromyko problem without a bloodletting. But he also foreswore the President's title for himself, which only a year before he had proclaimed should be combined with that of the General Secretary.

If it came to a vote in March, the split could have been as narrow as five to four, or five to five with Shcherbitskiy

in town. Now, only eight months later and without any publicly evident showdowns, Gorbachev appears to enjoy the support of four prior members and four more elevated since his accession. The remaining Brezhnevite party old guard -- Grishin, Shcherbitskiy, and Kunayev -- appear vulnerable and not long for this political world. Although not automatic, this has seemed to go very easily for Gorbachev, like Al Capone in an old folks home. Were Gorbachev to stumble badly, one can imagine anti-Gorbachev coalitions of remaining Old Guardists and younger figures who got to the Politburo prior to his accession. But since political line-ups are generally made by corridor politicking, not showdowns at the table, it is hard to see such a coalition taking shape. And it will be even less likely after the 27th CPSU congress.

Further down in the power structure, the bare statistics of the Gorbachev cadre renewal program are impressive:

- 8 new Central Committee department heads
- 2 new republic first secretaries (Georgian and Kirgiz)
- 33 new obkom first secretaries
- 2 new first deputy premiers
- 3 new deputy premiers
- 22 new ministers or state committee chairmen.

The bottom line is that there could be a 50% turnover in the composition of the Central Committee elected by the party congress, the biggest change in this body since 1961.

Gorbachev's age and apparent good health give him the prospect of being the most long-lived and powerful General Secretary since Stalin, reversing the law of diminishing General Secretaries operating since 1953.

But we have to step back from all this and remember some basics. Policymaking goes hand in hand with political struggle, and did so even under Brezhnev, although not so visibly as under Khrushchev. The tough policy problems lie ahead, most important and difficult the development and implementation of a whole range of organizational and resource allocation decisions aimed at revitalizing the economy. These will place great stress on the leadership and the apparatus. We should not imagine that the new generation of leaders advanced by Gorbachev represent a tightly unified political phalanx utterly detached from the interests and habits that made for the Brezhnev stasis. Having finally arrived, they too may wish to live peacefully and enjoy their privileges.

Finally, there is a political demographic factor to which I believe more attention should be paid. I haven't done the research to confirm my hypothesis, but let me lay it out in hopes that some enterprising Sovietologist will test it. The Brezhnev stasis was not simply a product of his policy of cadre stability. It was an echo of the great purges by which Stalin eliminated several leadership generations and elevated a post-Bolshevik generation who reached the

pinnacles of their careers in their thirties and forties and then stayed there for several decades. The youngsters of the Gorbachev generation are not replicating this pattern. They are reaching the top in their mid-fifties and early sixties. They can expect to be around for only ten years or so. More frequent cadre changes seem likely to become the norm. This suggests to me that there will be more turbulence in the Soviet nomenklatura class and its politics than its members have been used to as participants, and we as observers. That is, unless there is a new purge that repeats the Stalinist experience, which is another kind of turbulence.

V. The Economy and the Society

Let me turn now to the big problems, those of the economy and those of society in which economic problems are imbedded. Neither the economy nor the system are threatened with collapse. What we see is an economy that is underachieving, in large part because of the nature of the system, the tangible consequence of which is pervasive obstruction of the system's own goals for growth in the service of power, modernization, and welfare. By some path we cannot readily foresee, and only over the long term, if at all, the semi-stagnation of the system could conceivably threaten the stability of the system itself. This is a problem for political philosophers and futurologists. For now it is a problem for intelligence only insofar as it

animates the current concerns of the Soviet elite, which to a noticable degree it has.

The picture of Soviet economic slowdown is generally familiar. I shall only sketch it. In the last five years of Brezhnev, GNP growth averaged 2% or less per annum, industrial growth about 2.5%, agriculture minus 4.5%, and consumption per capita about 1.5%. Since the mid-1970s, the productivity of capital and labor has not only failed to grow, but appears to have declined. The causes of this dismal performance, and the secular decline of growth rates since the 1950s and 1960s have been:

The rising cost of new raw materials and energy

Stagnation in the size of the labor force owing to demographic factors

An aging and increasinsly backward capital stock. Thirty to forty percent of Soviet equipment is over 20 years old.

And the inhibitions imposed by the nature of the system -- constipated central planning, lack of incentives, etc. -- on innovation.

Since the death of Brezhnev the economy has rebounded somewhat largely as a product of disciplinary measures and better luck in agriculture. GNP growth has averaged nearly 3%, industrial growth about 3.5%, agriculture nearly 2%, and per capita consumption about 1.5%. Note that the consumption picture has not broadly improved, although the very important food situation has somewhat.

Although they appear modest by historical standards, the Gorbachev regime has set growth goals for the next five year plan and out to the year 2000 that are really quite ambitious. Average annual GNP growth is to be 3.5% through 1990 and 5% for the following decade. The Gorbachev strategy for intensive rather than extensive development -- which is incidentally rhetoric taken from Brezhnev and not new -- implies rates of growth in productivity which the USSR has not achieved the the post-war period.

As I said, the slowdown of economic growth is imbedded in a set of societal and systemic problems which are both cause and effect of poor economic performance:

- A lethargic bureaucracy, and an unmotivated workforce

- A whole array of social pathologies spanning alcohol abuse, rising crime rates, deteriorating public health conditions, and corruption embracing all quarters of the population.

- Patterns of attitudinal alienation including nationalism, both Russian and anti-Russian, increasing adherence to religion, and youth alienation.

None of these problems are unique to the recent period. But they seemed all to get worse. And they engendered during the late Brezhnev and the brief Chernenko periods a genuine apprehension within the Soviet elite that the system was running dangerously out of steam. Those in the top leadership of the Andropov-Gorbachev persuasion were particularly concerned that these pathologies, especially rampant corruption, were undermining the moral and political authority of the party itself.

Gorbachev has a three part strategy for addressing these problems. It seeks to address the society-systemic as well as the strictly economic. As yet, this strategy is not completely formed. But its shape is apparent.

First, come the so-called "human factors," basically increased discipline and moral motivation: cadre renewal, improved propaganda efforts and more frankness (or glasnost), anti-corruption measures, and the big campaign against alcohol abuse, which is probably the most profound single intervention by the Kremlin in the lives of Soviet people since de-Stalinization. By getting a sustained boost to economic performance simply through better work, Gorbachev hopes to boot-strap the economy into position for attaining his more ambitious growth and modernization goals, while maintaining a satisfactory consumption picture.

The second element of the Gorbachev strategy is technological modernization spurred by concentration of investment in the civil machinebuilding and related sectors. He hopes to dig Soviet industry out of smoke-stack backwardness at a rapid rate. Fifty percent of Soviet industrial equipment is supposed to be renewed by 1990.

The third major element, on which technological modernization depends, is some kind of reform of the planning, management and incentive system. Although the regime has implemented some management and structural

reforms, such as spreading the hybrid experiments throughout industry and consolidating the top management of machinebuilding and agroindustry, the full shape of Gorbachev's program here has yet to be seen. By all indications it is not yet decided, and it will occasion a lot of bureaucratic and political controversy in the deciding. So far Gorbachev has indicated that he wants his cake and to eat it too: He wants streamlined, more discipline, and effective central planning, particularly targetted on technological innovation. And he also wants more autonomy and responsibility, again mainly for innovation, at the enterprise level. Here, of course, is the rub. The progressive economists, some of whom appear to have Gorbachev's ear, know there must be farreaching devolution of authority to lower levels of the economic system. This means market mechanisms to some degree and reduced power for central party and ministerial magnates. The latter are, not surprisingly, not applauding.

How will Gorbachev do on these fronts? The uncertainties and risks loom large.

It is not sure that the human factors element can be sustained, especially if consumption levels appear to wallow.

The payoff to modernization via a revitalized machinebuilding sector will come only in the 1990s and

it would seem to depend on economic reforms not yet in place.

While not faced with any general crisis, the Soviet economy has some crisis-prone sectors that could pose real trouble. Agriculture's dependence on weather is one. Declining oil production is another, pinching Soviet hard currency earnings needed for industrial modernization and also, possibly, Moscow's ability to keep East Europe tranquil, on one hand, and pinched by Gorbachev's aim to channel new investment away from the energy sector. The plan calls for overall growth in energy production at a rate of 3-4%; the reality is likely to be more like 2%.

These warning signs should not be taken as predictions of failure. The regime is right in claiming that there is a lot of slack to be mobilized for economic revival. Determined leadership and whipcracking from the top can make a difference.

I find it equally interesting to speculate about some of the problems which might attend success rather than failure in the Gorbachev strategy. For example, both increased disciplinary measures throughout the apparatus and work force and any degree of decentralization are going to introduce new kinds of insecurity and tension within the system and society. As the regime gropes for its preferred reform formula, although its instincts and preferences are

generally conservative, it will find it hard to define and enforce all the boundaries of permitted political and ideological debate. Elements of the intelligentsia seem likely to test what they can get away with.

V. Foreign and Military Policy

Gorbachev is trying to revitalize Soviet foreign policy in something of the same manner he is trying to revitalize the economy and the society. He clearly wants to see what "human factors", i.e., changes of style and technique, can do for him before he considers fundamental shifts of goals and priorities.

In East-West relations, the basic goal of Soviet foreign policy is quite candidly stated and has remained relatively stable for some time: the restoration of an environment of detente like that which prevailed in the 1970s, wherein the Soviets can pursue both domestic and other foreign policy objectives with greater confidence and serenity than they can in an environment of tension, explicit hostility, and incipient confrontation.

In the mid- to late-1970s, the Soviets looked forward to a period of relatively easy foreign policy success during the 1980s. They had acquired a new order of superpower status based in large part on military power:

Parity plus at the strategic intercontinental level, which undermined both the credibility of US security guarantees and the confidence of US foreign policy.

Military dominance of the peripheral Eurasian theaters around them, which they expected to encourage a pattern of supplicant behavior on the part of their neighbors.

A new ability to project power in the Third World, not so much by conventional means where the US continued to be superior in such things as naval forces and air lift, but by political and military support to Leninist-style movements and regimes, such as we saw in Ethiopia, Angola, and Nicaragua, plus the use of the Cuban and perhaps other surrogates.

At the same time, the Soviets saw in the 1970s domestic and international trends which eroded the foundations of US superpower status, the cohesion of its alliances, and the credibility of its commitments. Detente was supposed to facilitate a low-risk, if not amiable, transition to Soviet preeminence.

The very late 1970s and early 1980s produced new trends, however, which challenged and disappointed these expectations. The US became disillusioned with detente and produced an administration committed to reversing the trends in the "correlation of forces" through increased military spending, reassertion of alliance leadership, and

reinvolverment of US power in third area security problems, all with a distressingly anti-Soviet policy rationale. Political developments produced governments in London, Bonn, Paris, Tokyo, and Beijing much more in harmony with US aims than the Soviets could find comforting. The Soviets found it much more difficult than they expected to turn impressive military power in being into tangible political influence. Their failed INF campaign in Europe is one example. The stalemate in Afghanistan is another.

Meanwhile, the economic slowdown and social malaise at home undermined Moscow's confidence that it could count on an inexorably favorable shift in the correlation of international forces.

The Soviet reaction to all this was counter-confrontational and aimed at jolting or frightening the US and especially its key allies into a return to the preferred pattern of behavior. In support of their efforts, the Soviets cranked up a war-scare propaganda campaign to lend credibility to their diplomacy and to mobilize internal cohesion. Relatively ineffective abroad, this campaign appears to have been counterproductive at home and in East Europe. Key elites began to believe that Moscow was mismanaging its America problem.

Both Andropov and Chernenko sought diffidently to change course, to reach out to an increasingly pressing political incentive on the part of the Reagan Administration to temper

its anti-Soviet policies. This was thwarted by KAL in the first case and by a combination of tactical miscalculation and political indecision in the second, specifically in the summer of 1984 when the Soviets proposed talks on space but refused to take yes for an answer. But by the fall of 1984, during the reign of Chernenko and the rule of Gromyko over Soviet foreign policy, the Soviets were on a course of diplomatic reengagement with a newly willing Washington.

Gorbachev has brought fresh energy and new style to this course. Underlying it is, I believe, a fairly strong consensus in Moscow -- including the redoubtable Gromyko -- that Soviet foreign policy has a much better chance of influencing Western governments, parliaments, and publics in favorable directions if it is willing to engage even the most uncooperative partners than if it limits itself to a pugnacious, defiant stance. At the same time, however, so long as the US and its allies tend to view the engagement as largely competitive, and resist the resurrection of old-style detente, the Soviets must balance reengagement with a fairly harsh element in their propaganda and a credible "or else" component to their diplomacy.

This is the balance which Gorbachev is now seeking to strike. It is proving somewhat tricky.

The basic aim of Gorbachev's foreign policy toward the US now is to delegitimize the main elements of the Reagan national security agenda from the first term: defense

buildup and the anti-Soviet thrust of US policies generally. If possible he would like the present administration itself to shift its priorities. At a minimum, he wants to encourage political forces within the US and the alliance which thwart administration aims and prevent their institutionalization in the next administration. The arms control process is the principal medium for pursuing these aims, and SDI is the main point of attack toward larger goals, in addition to being an urgent target in its own right.

So far, the Soviets have been unwilling to offer real concessions in the central strategic relationship -- where Soviet proposals and demands would leave the basic architecture of the balance intact and unsatisfactory from the US point of view -- or in the so-called regional security issues, the points of conflict that have arisen where the Soviets are seeking to consolidate Leninist regimes with Soviet arms. This is not to say that the Soviets will not show some flexibility on these issues in the future. There is considerable pressure for them to do so. But for now they are trying to see what they can get at no or low cost, through changes of style and playing on Western opinion.

With respect to the latter, the Soviets have much to learn. They want to exploit their remarkable access to Western political arenas. But here a will does not automatically

make a way. They have not adapted to the incredibly short attention spans of Western media and the volatility of active political agendas in open societies.

Some of our Sovietological comrades assert that the Soviets are ready to shift to a European strategy if the US proves uncooperative in this new period of reengagement. In my view, there are limits to Soviet discretion here and they appreciate them. Soviet ability to influence US allies is not the greatest when US-Soviet relations are in the deep freeze. Their approaches to US allies depend on some measure of promise in the direct US-Soviet relationship.

Let me quickly make a number of specific points:

The name of the game in arms control is get the Reagan Administration to sign up to some constraint on SDI which undermines the program politically. The Soviets probably do not expect the President to repudiate this program. They are not looking for one breakthrough so much as a politically influential process during the rest of his term in office. A sequence of summits gives them a good shot at this. But this is still a gamble, as one suspects some in the Kremlin are pointing out.

The Soviets are going to show new energy in pressing other foreign policy accounts, with the Chinese, the Japanese, and in the Middle East. Again one can expect

an effort to get what is possible on style before substantive flexibility is shown.

There is no sign that the present Soviet regime is prepared to back away from any of its Third World enterprises from Afghanistan to Nicaragua. It faces an uncomfortable degree of resistance in many of them. But so far, the costs, and especially the risks, have appeared tolerable.

Let me say a word about strategy and military policy. US policies have done more than just raise the ante of competition. At the core of the Soviet difficulty is that US initiatives, especially SDI and some conventional weapons innovations, will have a tendency to challenge the structure of Soviet strategy and forces at the intercontinental and theater levels...if those initiatives bear fruit. However the Soviets choose to respond to these initiatives, they will put new stress on the capacity of the system for technological innovation just at the time when that capacity is most needed in the civilian sector. The timing of these challenges is awkward for the Soviets to say the least. They are looking to the arms control process and to ancillary political constraints in the US to limit these challenges and to allow them to keep their strategic architecture fundamentally intact, quite possibly and even desirably in the context of reduced but more modernized and survivable nuclear strike forces.

VI. Conclusion

Having left many loose ends and important points untouched, let me conclude with an observation about Western and US capacity to influence Soviet policy. I have myself characterized both domestic policy and foreign policy as currently in somewhat of an exploratory phase. Clearly Soviet domestic economic plans depend to a considerable extent on expectations regarding the course of US-Soviet relations, particularly the military competition. This would suggest an unusual degree of US leverage over Soviet perceptions and choices. Perhaps that leverage is higher than usual.

But it should not be exaggerated. The USSR is going to remain an assertive and powerful adversary even if its policy priorities are adjusted. Especially in the Third World it can pose severe challenges at little cost. The fact of competition is lodged in the nature of the systems and their conceptions of mission, responsibility, and security -- as Soviet ideologues are prompt to insist in their own idiom.

I want, however, to make a further point about leverage. It has to do with the Soviet style, the Bolshevik code, or whatever you want to call it. Soviet rulers do not regard national priorities and strategic directions as something they bargain with adversaries about. They make an assessment of the objective situation, of which the policies

and preferences of adversary states are among the factors, and chose their basic course. If necessary and profitable, they bargain about the terms at the margin. There is little reason to think that Gorbachev is going to change this not unreasonable way of doing business. We cannot make his strategy and goals in the West. But it will matter to us what they are.